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Currently, a growing body of studies
demonstrates memory-perception inter-
actions (see Barsalou, 2008; Heurley et al.,
2012; Lobel, 2014, for reviews). Even if
such interactions are highly relevant to
support embodied approaches of cog-
nition as well as to better understand
memory and perception (e.g., Zwaan,
2008; Versace et al., 2009; Landau et al.,
2010; Kiefer and Barsalou, 2013), their
functional role remains unclear: Why
would perception integrate memory and
knowledge while it seems highly effi-
cient without such influences? To under-
stand the functional relevance of these
interactions, we assume that it is nec-
essary to take into account two impor-
tant conditions in which our cognitive
systems have evolved during the phy-
logenesis and continue to evolve dur-
ing our ontogenesis. More precisely, we
develop a view where memory-perception
interactions are highly relevant to plan
and control actions when we interact
with well-known objects in non-optimal
perceptual conditions.
It is widely accepted that to prop-
erly parameterize action components and
to control them during the course of
action, it is necessary to perceptually
process some object’s features (Hommel
and Elsner, 2009). As already claimed
by Glover (2004), these “action-relevant
perceptual features” (ARPF) can be spa-
tial (e.g., shape, orientation) as well as
non-spatial (e.g., fragility, weight). Among
spatial-ARPF, size is usually recognized
as an important cause to its involvement
in a great variety of actions. Jeannerod
(1984) has for example demonstrated that
the magnitude of the grip aperture, a
component of the grasping movement,
is function to the visual size of objects
(see also Ellis et al., 2007; Fagioli et al.,
2007; Wykowska et al., 2009). Visual
size processing also seems highly impor-
tant in order to intercept flying objects
(Lee, 1976). Nevertheless, very frequently
and for various reasons, the perceptual
processing of ARPF is far from being opti-
mal especially in “out-of-laboratory” con-
ditions. For instance, some ARPF can’t
be processed by the available perceptual
channels. Indeed, when we want to grasp
an object, we are only able to visually per-
ceive it and therefore we are unable to
directly perceive its fragility, weight, and
temperature whereas they are extremely
relevant to plan the force and the velocity
of the grasp (Glover, 2004). Even when the
right channels are available, some environ-
mental conditions can impair perception.
For example, the occlusion of an object by
other surfaces can limit our ability to visu-
ally perceive it and thus process its shape,
size, or distance (Tanaka et al., 2001).
Furthermore, short- or long-term injuries
to perceptual systems can also induce non-
optimal conditions of perception. Indeed,
the eyes can be long-term-impaired by
cell aging or short-term-impaired by an
intense flash light, but in both cases our
ability to process visual features is affected.
Accordingly, how do we plan and con-
trol actions in conditions where features
that are suited to plan and control rel-
evant parameters of action cannot often
be optimally perceived? First of all, it
is important to note that non-optimal
processing of ARPF do not necessar-
ily induce object-recognition problems.
Indeed, as mentioned in several models,
object recognition can be accurately based
on non-ARPF such as the color and/or the
texture of objects and the context (Tanaka
et al., 2001; Bar, 2009). Therefore, even if
some ARPF cannot be processed, objects
can be accurately identified in many cases.
Secondly, because in everyday life we
mainly interact with well-known objects,
preserved ability to recognize object iden-
tity can automatically induce the retrieval
of a myriad of knowledge associated with
the recognized-objects including associ-
ated ARPF (e.g., shape, size). Thus, we
claim that recognition processes used to
identify objects during the planning phase
of actions involve the retrieval of previ-
ous experienced ARPF that are automat-
ically integrated into perception. We also
claim that they allow compensating non-
optimally perceived ARPF and so to main-
tain a high level of action efficiency even in
non-optimal conditions of perception. To
resume, we assume that the functional rel-
evance of memory-perception interactions
(i.e., an embodied cognitive architecture)
occurs when humans interact with well-
known objects in degraded-perceptual-
conditions. We discuss three potential sets
of evidence, coming from studies all focus-
ing on the ARPF size in support of this
view.
First, numerous experiments suggests
that memory would be able to store
objects’ perceptual features and especially
ARPF (see Barsalou, 2008, for a review).
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For instance, a great variety of studies
support the idea that the size of objects is
accurately stored in memory and closely
matches their real visual organization
(Moyer, 1973; Holyoak, 1977; Holyoak
et al., 1979; Shoben and Wilson, 1998;
Bertamini et al., 2011; Konkle and Oliva,
2011; Linsen et al., 2011). More impor-
tantly, it seems that the known size of
objects can be automatically retrieved even
when objects are briefly perceived sug-
gesting the possible automatic retrieval of
ARPF during fast real interactions with
objects. Ferrier et al. (2007) have for exam-
ple demonstrated that a target picture
(e.g., an elephant) is easily categorized as
an animal when the brief prime picture
(150ms) has a similar known size (e.g.,
a giraffe or a car) rather than a different
(e.g., a bee or a key) while both pictures
have the same visual size on the screen (see
also Setti et al., 2009; Gabay et al., 2013).
It is noteworthy that the size is generally
stable across items of a category as well
as across experiences. Because all the lady-
bugs we experienced have approximately
the same small size, their size can be eas-
ily stored at a conceptual level (i.e., general
knowledge, Whittlesea, 1987). However, in
some cases, ARPF could be stored in a
more specific or short-term format. For
example, because the size of your car is
not shared by all the exemplars of the
“car” category, this feature is undoubtedly
stored in a more autobiographic format.
Furthermore, some ARPF are so variable
that we can only store them for a short
period of time like the last position of your
car on the supermarket car park or the dis-
tance of some objects on a table (see also
Borghi, 2013 for a close distinction). Thus,
we claim that ARPF can be stored and
automatically retrieved from memory but
perhaps in various ways according to the
stability of the ARPF across experiences.
Moreover, several studies suggest that
ARPF are not only stored but can also
influence conscious perception. Among
others, the case of the size perception has
been strongly studied. In a primary study,
Paivio (1975) has demonstrated that the
comparison of the known sizes of objects is
faster when they are congruent with their
visual sizes. In others words, it is easier
to say that in general an elephant is larger
than a mouse when in the experiment the
picture of the elephant is presented larger
than the picture of the mouse rather than
smaller (see also Srinivas, 1996; Rubinsten
and Henik, 2002; Konkle and Oliva, 2012,
for similar results). The works of Riou et al.
(2011) and Rey et al. (2014) go further
and suggest the automatic nature of this
influence. Riou et al. (2011) have demon-
strated that the known size of objects can
influence the detection of a visually odd-
sized stimulus in a visual search task while
such an object’s feature is absolutely use-
less to complete the task. Others stud-
ies have demonstrated an influence of the
known size of objects on the judgment of
distance that are often derived from visual
size suggesting that the stored size can
automatically impact not only the percep-
tion of visual size but also the perception
of other ARPF derived from it (Epstein,
1965; Predebon, 1992, 1994; Hershenson
and Samuels, 1999; Distler et al., 2000).
Besides the known size of objects, the per-
ception of visual size can be affected by a
more abstract kind of size representation:
numbers. Henik and Tzelgov (1982) have
replicated the interaction between visual-
and stored-size reported by Paivio (1975)
but with numbers. In a classic bisection
task requiring implicit length estimation,
de Hevia and Spelke (2009) have found
a bias of bisection toward the side of the
line where the larger number is printed.
In a reproduction task, Viarouge and de
Hevia (2013) have demonstrated that large
numbers (e.g., 9) presented at each cor-
ner of a square induce larger reproduction
of this square compared to the condition
where smaller numbers are presented (e.g.,
2). Altogether, these studies support the
possibility that the size stored in memory
(i.e., known size of objects or numbers)
can directly influence the perception of
size or of size-related features (e.g., dis-
tance) supporting the possible completion
of perception by stored-ARPF when some
of them are missing or ambiguous (see
Barsalou, 2009, for a similar idea).
A further step is achieved by recent
works demonstrating the influence of size
stored in memory on more automatic
perception-action links (rather than con-
scious judgments). Indeed, some studies
have been able to show an influence of the
known size of objects on action parame-
ters that are dependent on the visual size.
For instance, Hosking and Crassini (2010)
have conducted experiments in which
participants have to carry out time-to-
contact judgments on stimuli for which a
linear or a parabolic trajectory of approach
are simulated. Such a judgment is highly
important for a great variety of inter-
ceptive actions and is mainly based on
the online processing of the visual size
of the approaching stimulus. In their
experiments, the stimuli used have dif-
ferent known sizes (i.e., large: a football
vs. small: a tennis ball). Results elegantly
demonstrated that this stored feature of
objects influences time-to-contact judg-
ments suggesting that it could interfere
with our ability to intercept mobiles (see
also DeLucia, 2005; Hosking and Crassini,
2011, for similar results). Another set of
studies suggest also an influence of the
known size of objects on another well-
established perception-action link: Our
ability to adapt our grip aperture accord-
ing to the visual size of the to-be-grasped
objects (Jeannerod, 1984). Several studies
demonstrate that participants are faster
to carry out a precision grip on typically
small objects (e.g., cherry) and a power
grip on typically large objects (i.e., egg-
plant; Ellis and Tucker, 2000; Tucker and
Ellis, 2004; Derbyshire et al., 2006; Girardi
et al., 2010) even when visual size cannot
interfere (Glover et al., 2004; Tucker and
Ellis, 2004; Heurley et al., in revision). The
same effect on grip aperture is obtained
when size-related adjectives are concomi-
tantly processed (e.g., SMALL/LARGE,
LONG/SHORT) rather than known
objects (Gentilucci and Gangitano, 1998;
Gentilucci et al., 2000; Glover and Dixon,
2002). These results are also replicated
when numbers are used. More concretely,
Moretto and di Pellegrino (2008) have
shown that large number processing facil-
itate power grips while small number
processing facilitate precision grips (see
also Andres et al., 2004; Lindemann et al.,
2007). In addition, some results support
that such interactions are highly automatic
(Moretto and di Pellegrino, 2008; Namdar
et al., 2014) and seems to be restricted to
the planning phase of grasping (Glover
and Dixon, 2002; Glover et al., 2004;
Badets et al., 2007; Andres et al., 2008).
Taken together, these works demonstrate
that stored ARPF, such as size, can influ-
ence automatic perception-action links
and not only conscious perception sup-
porting the possibility that perception
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can be completed by stored ARPF, itself
influencing the planning of some action
components.
This short review suggests that the
ARPF size can be stored in memory,
automatically retrieved during object
perception, and can influence conscious
perception of visual size (or related-
features) as well as the planning of action
components mainly based on visual size
processing. We used this evidence to
support the view that the interactions
between present and absent–but sim-
ulated in memory–perceptual features
are important for action especially in
“out-of-laboratory conditions” in which
ARPF can’t be optimally perceived and in
which interactions mainly occur with well-
known objects. Of course, the reported
evidence is limited to the size, but several
studies have already demonstrated that
other ARPF such as distance, position,
and weight could be stored and auto-
matically retrieved (Estes et al., 2008;
Scorolli et al., 2009; Winter and Bergen,
2012). This strongly suggests that our view
can be extended. Even if many questions
remain open and a lot of work has to be
done to best support this view, it has the
advantage to search for the functional rele-
vance of memory-perception interactions
(i.e., an embodied cognitive architecture)
by taking into account two main con-
straints in which our cognitive systems
have certainly evolved at phylogenetic and
ontogenetic scales: Interactions with (i)
well-known objects in (ii) more or less
degraded-perceptual-conditions.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
We are grateful to Gabrielle Chesnoy-
Servanin for her revision of the English
text.
REFERENCES
Andres, M., Davare, M., Pesenti, M., Olivier, E.,
and Seron, X. (2004). Number magnitude
and grip aperture interaction. Neuroreport 15,
2773–2777.
Andres, M., Ostryc, D. J., Nicola, F., and Pause, T.
(2008). Time course of number magnitude inter-
ference during grasping. Cortex 44, 414–419. doi:
10.1016/j.cortex.2007.08.007
Badets, A., Andres, M., Di Luca, S., and Pesenti,
M. (2007). Number magnitude potentiates action
judgements. Exp. Brain Res. 180, 525–534. doi:
10.1007/s00221-007-0870-y
Bar, M. (2009). The proactive brain: memory for pre-
dictions. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364,
1235–1243. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0310
Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Grounded cogni-
tion. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59, 617–645. doi:
10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093639
Barsalou, L. W. (2009). Simulation, situated con-
ceptualization, and prediction. Philos. Trans. R.
Soc Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364, 1281–1289. doi:
10.1098/rstb.2008.0319
Bertamini, M., Bennett, K. M., and Bode, C. (2011).
The anterior bias in visual art: the case of
images of animals. Laterality 16, 673–689. doi:
10.1080/1357650X.2010.508219
Borghi, A. (2013). “Language comprehension: action,
affordances and goals,” in Language and Action
in Cognitive Neuroscience, eds Y. Coello and
A. Bartolo (New-York, NY: Psychology Press),
125–144.
de Hevia, M.-A., and Spelke, E. S. (2009).
Spontaneous mapping of number and space
in adults and young children. Cognition 110,
198–207. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.11.003
DeLucia, P. R. (2005). Does binocular disparity
or familiar size override effects of relative size
on judgments of time to contact? Q. J. Exp.
Psychol. A 58, 865–886. doi: 10.1080/02724980443
000377
Derbyshire, N., Ellis, R., and Tucker, M. (2006). The
potentiation of two components of the reach-
to-grasp action during object categorisation in
visual memory. Acta Psychol. 122, 74–98. doi:
10.1016/j.actpsy.2005.10.004
Distler, H. K., Gegenfurtner, K. R., van Veen, H. A.
H. C., and Hawken, M. J. (2000). Velocity con-
stancy in a virtual reality environment. Perception
29, 1423–1435. doi: 10.1068/p3115
Ellis, R., and Tucker, M. (2000). Micro-affordance:
the potentiation of components of action by
seen objects. Br. J. Psychol. 9, 451–471. doi:
10.1348/000712600161934
Ellis, R., Tucker, M., Symes, E., and Vainio, L.
(2007). Does selecting one visual object from sev-
eral require inhibition of the actions associated
with nonselected objects? J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 33, 670–691. doi: 10.1037/0096-
1523.33.3.670
Epstein, W. (1965). Nonrelational judgments of size
and distance. Am. J. Psychol. 78, 120–123. doi:
10.2307/1421091
Estes, Z., Verges, M., and Barsalou, L. W. (2008). Head
up, foot down: object words orient attention to
the objects’ typical location. Psychol. Sci. 19, 93–97.
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02051.x
Fagioli, S., Hommel, B., and Schubotz, R. I. (2007).
Intentional control of attention: action plan-
ning primes action related stimulus dimensions.
Psychol. Res. 71, 22–29. doi: 10.1007/s00426-005-
0033-3
Ferrier, L., Staudt, A., Reilhac, G., Jiménez, M.,
and Brouillet, D. (2007). L’influence de la taille
typique des objets dans une tâche de catégori-
sation. Can. J. Exp. Psychol. 61, 316–321. doi:
10.1037/cjep2007031
Gabay, S., Leibovich, T., Henik, A., and Gronau,
N. (2013). Size before numbers: conceptual size
primes numerical value. Cognition 129, 18–23. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2013.06.001
Gentilucci, M., Benuzzi, F., Bertolani, L., Daprati,
E., and Gangitano, M. (2000). Language and
motor control. Exp. Brain Res. 133, 468–490. doi:
10.1007/s002210000431
Gentilucci, M., and Gangitano, M. (1998). Influence
of automatic word reading on motor control.
Eur. J. Neurosci. 10, 752–756. doi: 10.1046/j.1460-
9568.1998.00060.x
Girardi, G., Lindemann, O., and Bekkering, H.
(2010). Context effects on the processing
of action-relevant object features. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 36, 330–340.
doi: 10.1037/a0017180
Glover, S. (2004). Separate visual representations in
the planning and control of action. Behav. Brain
Sci. 27, 3–24. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X04000020
Glover, S., and Dixon, P. (2002). Semantics affect
the planning but not control of grasping. Exp.
Brain Res. 146, 383–387. doi: 10.1007/s00221-002-
1222-6
Glover, S., Rosenbaum, D. A., Graham, J., and Dixon,
P. (2004). Grasping the meaning of words. Exp.
Brain Res. 154, 103–108. doi: 10.1007/s00221-003-
1659-2
Henik, A., and Tzelgov, J. (1982). Is three greater than
five: the relation between physical and semantic
size in comparison tasks. Mem. Cogn. 10, 389–395.
doi: 10.3758/BF03202431
Hershenson, M., and Samuels, S. M. (1999). An air-
plane illusion: apparent velocity determined by
apparent distance. Perception 28, 433–436. doi:
10.1068/p2779
Heurley, L. P., Milhau, A., Chesnoy, G., Ferrier, L. P.,
Brouillet, T., and Brouillet, D. (2012). Influence
of language on color perception: a simulationnist
explanation. Biolinguistics 6, 354–382.
Holyoak, K. J. (1977). The form of analog size infor-
mation in memory. Cogn. Psychol. 9, 31–51. doi:
10.1016/0010-0285(77)90003-2
Holyoak, K. J., Dumais, S. T., and Moyer, R. S.
(1979). Semantic association effects in a mental
comparison task. Mem. Cogn. 7, 303–313. doi:
10.3758/BF03197604
Hommel, B., and Elsner, B. (2009). “Acquisition,
representation and control of action,” in Oxford
Handbook of Human Action, eds E. Morsella, J.
A. Bargh, and P. M. Gollwitzer (Oxford: Oxford
University Press), 371–398.
Hosking, S. G., and Crassini, B. (2010). The effects
of familiar size and object trajectories on time-to-
contact judgements. Exp. Brain Res. 203, 541–552.
doi: 10.1007/s00221-010-2258-7
Hosking, S. G., and Crassini, B. (2011). The influence
of optic expansion rates when judging the relative
time to contact of familiar objects. J. Vis. 11, 1–13.
doi: 10.1167/11.6.20
Jeannerod, M. (1984). The timing of natural prehen-
sion movements. J. Mot. Behav. 16, 235–254. doi:
10.1080/00222895.1984.10735319
Kiefer, M., and Barsalou, L. W. (2013). “Grounding
the human conceptual system in perception, action
and internal states,” in Action Science: Foundations
of an Emerging Discipline, eds W. Prinz, M. Beisert,
and A. Herwig (Cambridge: MIT Press), 381–408.
doi: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262018555.003.0015
Konkle, T., and Oliva, A. (2011). Canonical visual
size for real-world objects. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum.
Percept. Perform. 7, 23–37. doi: 10.1037/a0020413
Konkle, T., and Oliva, A. (2012). A familiar-
size stroop effect: real-world size is an auto-
matic property of object representation. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 38, 561–569. doi:
10.1037/a0028294
www.frontiersin.org January 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1553 | 3
Heurley and Ferrier What are memory-perception interactions for?
Landau, M. J., Meier, B. P., and Keefer, L. A. (2010). A
metaphor-enriched social cognition. Psychol. Bull.
136, 1045–1067. doi: 10.1037/a0020970
Lee, D. N. (1976). A theory of visual control of brak-
ing based on information about time-to-collision.
Perception 5, 437–459. doi: 10.1068/p050437
Lindemann, O., Abolafia, J. M., Girardi, G., and
Bekkering, H. (2007). Getting a grip on numbers:
numerical magnitude priming in object grasp-
ing. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 33,
1400–1409. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.33.6.1400
Linsen, S., Leyssen, M. H. R., Sammartino, J., and
Palmer, S. E. (2011). Aesthetic preferences in the
size of images of real-world objects. Perception 40,
291–298. doi: 10.1167/10.7.1234
Lobel, T. (2014). Sensation: the Sew Science of Physical
Intelligence. New York, NY: Atria Books.
Moretto, G., and di Pellegrino, G. (2008). Grasping
numbers. Exp. Brain Res. 188, 505–515. doi:
10.1007/s00221-008-1386-9
Moyer, R. S. (1973). Comparing object in
memory: evidence suggesting and internal
psychophysics. Percept. Psychophys. 13, 180–184.
doi: 10.3758/BF03214124
Namdar, G., Tzelgov, J., Algom, D., and Ganel, T.
(2014). Grasping numbers: evidence for auto-
matic influence of numerical magnitude on grip
aperture. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 21, 830–835. doi:
10.3758/s13423-013-0550-9
Paivio, A. (1975). Perceptual comparaisons through
the mind’s eye. Mem. Cogn. 3, 653–647. doi:
10.3758/BF03198229
Predebon, J. (1992). The role of instructions and
familiar size in absolute judgments of size and
distance. Percept. Psychophys. 51, 344–354. doi:
10.3758/BF03211628
Predebon, J. (1994). Perceived size of familiar objects
and the theory of off-sized perceptions. Percept.
Psychophys. 56, 238–247. doi: 10.3758/BF03213902
Rey, A. E., Riou, B., and Versace, R. (2014).
Demonstration of an ebbinghaus illusion at a
memory level: manipulation of the memory size
and not the perceptual size. Exp. Psychol. 61,
378–384. doi: 10.1027/1618-3169/a000258
Riou, B., Lesourd, M., Brunel, L., and Versace, R.
(2011). Visual memory and visual perception:
when memory improves visual search.Mem. Cogn.
39, 1094–1102. doi: 10.3758/s13421-011-0075-2
Rubinsten, O., and Henik, A. (2002). Is an ant larger
than a lion? Acta Psychol. 111, 141–154. doi:
10.1016/S0001-6918(02)00047-1
Scorolli, C., Borghi, A. M., and Glenberg, A. M.
(2009). Language-induced motor activity in bi-
manual object lifting. Exp. Brain Res. 193, 43–53.
doi: 10.1007/s00221-008-1593-4
Setti, A., Caramelli, N., and Borghi, A. M. (2009).
Conceptual information about size of objects in
nouns. Eur. J. Cogn. Psychol. 21, 1022–1044. doi:
10.1080/09541440802469499
Shoben, E. J., andWilson, T. L. (1998). Categorization
in judgments of relative magnitude. J. Mem. Lang.
38, 94–111. doi: 10.1006/jmla.1997.2534
Srinivas, K. (1996). Size and reflection effects in prim-
ing: a test of transfer-appropriate processing.Mem.
Cognit. 24, 441–452. doi: 10.3758/BF03200933
Tanaka, J. W., Weiskopf, D., and Williams, P.
(2001). The role of color in high-level vision.
Trends Cogn. Sci. 5, 211–215. doi: 10.1016/S1364-
6613(00)01626-0
Tucker, M., and Ellis, R. (2004). Action priming
by briefly presented objects. Acta Psychol. 116,
185–203. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2004.01.004
Versace, R., Labeye, E., Badard, G., and Rose, M.
(2009). The contents of long-term memory and
the emergence of knowledge. Eur. J. Cogn. Psychol.
21, 522–560. doi: 10.1080/09541440801951844
Viarouge, A., and de Hevia, M.-A. (2013). The role
of numerical magnitude and order in the illusory
perception of size and brightness. Front. Psychol.
4:484. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00484
Whittlesea, B. W. A. (1987). Preservation of spe-
cific experiences in the representation of general
knowledge. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 13,
3–17. doi: 10.1037/0278-7393.13.1.3
Winter, B., and Bergen, B. (2012). Language com-
prehenders represent object distance both visu-
ally and auditorily. Lang. Cogn. 4, 1–16. doi:
10.1515/langcog-2012-0001
Wykowska, A., Schubö, A., and Hommel, B. (2009).
How you move is what you see: action plan-
ning biases selection in visual search. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 35, 1755–1769.
doi: 10.1037/a0016798
Zwaan, R. A. (2008). “Experiential traces and
mental simulations in language comprehen-
sion,” in Symbols and Embodiment: Debates
on meaning and cognition, eds M. de Vega,
A. M. Glenberg, and A. C. Graesser (Oxford:
Oxford University Press), 165–180. doi:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217274.003.0009
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare
that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 08 November 2014; accepted: 15 December
2014; published online: 08 January 2015.
Citation: Heurley LP and Ferrier LP (2015) What
are memory-perception interactions for? Implications
for action. Front. Psychol. 5:1553. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2014.01553
This article was submitted to Cognition, a section of the
journal Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2015 Heurley and Ferrier. This is an
open-access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The
use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is per-
mitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are
credited and that the original publication in this journal
is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice.
No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which
does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition January 2015 | Volume 5 | Article 1553 | 4
